Missouri Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 1 Winter 1966

Article 8

Winter 1966

Current Problems in Pleading, Discovery and Settlements
John S. Divilbiss

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John S. Divilbiss, Current Problems in Pleading, Discovery and Settlements, 31 MO. L. REV. (1966)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Divilbiss: Divilbiss: Current Problems in Pleading

CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PLEADING,
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENTS
JOHN S. DiviLBiss*

I. PLEADING
A. Departure

Plaintiffs continue to be troubled by petitions which are not broad
enough to permit introduction of necessary proof. Such was the problem
in Lorraine v. E. M. HarrisBldg. Co.- Plaintiff was injured when she fell

on the slick concrete porch of defendant's "display house." Plaintiff complained that the porch and walk were dry but that a "wooly mat" on the
porch was soaked with water. When she stepped on the mat her shoes
became wet causing her to slip on the "glaze" finish of the front porch.
The petition is not set out in the opinion but the briefs indicate that it made
no reference to the sinister wet mat.
The problem first arose during voir dire examination when plaintiff
made a reference to the wet mat. Defendant objected that this was outside
the pleadings, but the trial judge overruled the defendant because the wet
m4t was mentioned in plaintiff's deposition. Defendant protested that it

was "surprised" and requested a continuance. This too was overruled and
defendant continued its protest throughout the trial, including an objection
to plaintiff's verdict directing instruction which was premised on the existence of a wet mat. The jury gave plaintiff a verdict and defendant appealed.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals said:
As stated by our Supreme Court in the case of Faught v. St.
Louis, San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo., 325 S.W.2d 776, 781, "...
neither the evidence nor the instructions may be broader than the
pleadings, one may not plead one state of facts in theory and to
the unprepared surprise of his adversary recover on another and
2
different theory and state of facts ... ." (Emphasis supplied.)

*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 391 S.W.2d 939 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
2. Id. at 943.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

1

6

Missouri Law Review,
31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 8
MISSOURI
LAWVol.REVIEW

[Vol. 31

The court concluded: "Appellant's assertion that there was no allegation
in the petition concerning the wet mat is correct. And no amendment to
the petition was made." (Emphasis supplied.) 3 The court acknowledged
that the mat had been mentioned in plaintiff's deposition so that it was not
a complete surprise to defendant. By pointing to the absence of an amendment, the court implied that a different result might have been reached
had the amendment been made.
Harsh as it seems, failure of plaintiff to go through the simple formality
of getting leave to amend may have affected the outcome of the case. So
long as the petition remained unchanged, proof of the wet mat was outside
the pleadings and admission of the evidence would be error.- Had plaintiff

3. Ibid.
4. It is far from clear why it is error to let in "unsurprising" evidence not

supported by the pleading, but proper to let in the same evidence after the ritual

of amending of the pleadings. Such seems to have been the rule in Missouri for a
long time. For example, in Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co., 225 S.W.2d 798 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1949), plaintiff pleaded certain injuries but neglected to plead resulting high blood pressure. Defendant was not surprised at the trial as plaintiff
had mentioned the condition in her statement to defendant's investigator and
during an examination by defendant's doctor. Evidence of the blood pressure was
admitted over defendant's objection and the court of appeals reversed. Significantly, the court said, at 801: "However, we are of the opinion that although it
cannot be said that defendant was 'surprised' when plaintiff presented evidence at
the trial relating to the condition of her blood pressure, defendant nevertheless

had the right to object to such evidence on the ground that it related to 'special

damages' which were not pleaded in plaintiff's petition. Although defendant could
not have claimed 'surprise' upon the introduction of such evidence, it was not
required to do so and its objections at the trial to such evidence in the absence
of proper allegations thereon in plaintiff's petition should have been sustained.
No such special damages were pleaded by plaintiff, nor did plaintiff ask leave to
amend her petition to include such special damages which, she could have done
on such terms, at that stage of the proceedings, as the court should order."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus it was error for the trial judge to admit the testimony as to high blood
pressure but inferentially would not have been error to admit the same testimony
immediately after an amendment. This seems an undue deference to form at the
expense of substance.
In contrast at least one federal court has taken a more practical view of
looking solely to prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence. In State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 198 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1952), plaintiff pleaded a lacerated
and sprained left knee and the trial judge, over defendant's objection, admitted
proof of a "fractured" knee. The court of appeals said, at page 153: "However,
it appears that the defendant requested that the plaintiff submit to a physical
examination by its physician a few days prior to the trial and that upon this
examination the knowledge of the actual extent of the injury became known to
such physician. The present Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. have abrogated the function of the complaint to state fully and in detail the claims upon
which the plaintiff will rely and litigants have the responsibility of limiting such
claims by employing the discovery methods so amply available. In any event, the
determination of such questions must necessarily rest largely within the discretion
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
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requested leave to amend and had the trial court allowed the amendment,
the question on appeal would then have been entirely different.
Missouri Rule 55.53 states that leave to amend "shall be freely given
when justice so requires." Conversely the trial judge would have been
guilty of error in allowing a late amendment only if justice did not "so
require." Nor is a continuance necessarily required. The supreme court has
expressly approved such late amendments, saying:
An amendment of an adversary's pleading does not entitle a party
to a continuance as a matter of course ...

and where it appears

from the pleadings, application for continuance and testimony that
the parties have prepared to meet the issues tendered by the amendment, a continuance on account of the amendment is not necessary. , . . No showing was made that defendants were not ready

to meet the allegations of the amended petition, or that different
witnesses not then available would be required, or that defendant's rights were prejudiced in any manner.5
The wet mat was not a complete surprise to defendant for "the wet
mat was mentioned in plaintiff's deposition." Nor does it seem that the case
would have been defended differently had the mat been mentioned in the
original pleading for defendant's only testimony was an expert who testified
that the steps and porch were typical of porch slabs throughout the area.
The court does not even discuss the question of whether the wet mat testimony actually prejudiced defendant.
The Missouri Supreme Court has said: "If every case in which improper questions were asked was reversed, few verdicts would stand. '6
Reversals have accordingly been limited to prejudicial error. No clear reason appears for applying a different standard in cases where the proof is
beyond the pleadings.
B. Intervention
Occasionally a party is on the outside of a lawsuit when he prefers to be
in it. Upon proper application he may be allowed to intervene and thus
participate without being invited. On some occasions his intervention is a
rigkt, in others it is permissive or discretionary with the trial judge. He
of the trial judge. In this case, no prejudice is shown to have resulted to the defendant and the trial Court properly held that, under the circumstances, the
evidence was properly admissible."
5. Ethridge v. Perryman, 363 S.W.2d 696, 703 (Mo. 1963).
6. Ryan v. Campbell "66" Express, 300 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. En Banc
1957).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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has a "right" to intervene if "the representation of [his] ... interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate" and he will or may be "bound by a
7
judgment in the action."
The attempted intervention is not always welcome. Such was the case
in Stdt ex rel. Royal-McBee v. Luten.8 Plaintiff, an employee of RoyalMcBee, was injured in an automobile collision which arose out of and in the
scope of her employment. She was paid Workmen's Compensation and later
filed suit against the tort-feasor who injured her. Employer and its Workmen's Compensation carrier were entitled to subrogation from any recovery
which plaintiff made so they hired plaintiff's own attorney to represent
their special interests as subrogees Plaintiff's attorney thereafter concluded
that he could not represent both plaintiff and the subrogees because of a
potential conflict of interests and he so notified the subrogees.
Plaintiff's case against the negligent tort-feasor was set for trial in April
1964. In March the subrogees filed a petition to intervene. The petition
was denied and subrogees brought a mandamus action in the St. Louis
Court of Appeals. The subrogees argued that they had a -rightto intervene
because they would be bound by the judgment and "their representation
in the law suit is or may be inadequate (in fact does not exist by reason
of the withdrawal of [plaintiff's attorney] as their counsel). "1O
The court of appeals concluded that the inadequate representation
was "established by the record filed in this court and need not be considered further." 1 This conclusion is not only surprising but the absence of
any consideration of the subject is disturbing. The opinion seems to assume
that the subrogees' interests necessarily will go on unrepresented unless subrogees' own attorney sits at the counsel table. The conclusion
is doubtful to say the least. The interests of plaintiff and subrogees in the
conduct of the trial would seem to be parallel in every respect. Plaintiff's
own attorney will be trying to get a judgment against the tort-feasor of a
sufficient size to reimburse subrogees and have something left over for plaintiff herself. The subrogees' interests can hardly conflict with the interests
of plaintiff. Conceivably a subrogee might worry that a plaintiff's own
7. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.11.
8. 390 S.W.2d 931 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
9. Presumably the conflict would arise when settlement offers were made.
Subrogees would be wise to accept a settlement offer equal to subrogees' claim.
The same offer should be rejected by plaintiff who would have nothing to gain
from such a settlement and who would be wise to gamble on a bigger verdict.
10. State ex rel. Royal-McBee v. Luten, supra note 8, at 933.
11. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
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attorney was incapable of presenting plaintiff's case, thus putting subrogee's
rights in jeopardy. But in this case the subrogees had sufficient confidence
in plaintiff's attorney that they initially hired him to represent their interests. Subrogees' sudden apprehension about the well-being of their interest is neither discussed nor explained.
Conceivably subrogees might have worried about collecting their subrogation from plaintiff, although nothing in the case supports such an
apprehension. The trial judge expressly preserved to subrogees their right
to refile a petition for intervention "subsequent to jury verdict." This
would have permitted any judgment to run in favor of both plaintiff and
subrogees and would have fully protected subrogees.
While subrogees prevailed they accomplished very little. It is not at
all clear that subrogees have the right to control the lawsuit and few things
could be more detrimental to subrogees' position than a lack of unity in
presentation of plaintiff's case. About the only thing accomplished was a
delay during which defendant's insurer became insolvent-something of a
Pyrrhic victory.
The case is disturbing because it holds that a subrogee's interests are
conclusively presumed to be inadequately represented by plaintiff's attorney, no matter how competent the attorney. When plaintiff's sole objective
is a large verdict, it is hard to understand why a fully competent attorney
would not adequately represent a subrogee's interests.

II. DiscovwRY
A. Duty to Amend Interrogatory Answers Wken Additio'al Facts
Are Discovered
Does a lawyer have a continuing duty to amend interrogatory answers
if new facts are discovered after the initial answers are filed? This question
has been argued among Missouri lawyers for some time but no clear answer
has yet been provided. Such a duty was claimed in the recent case of Aidgur
v. Zylic k. 12 Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained when struck by
defendant's automobile. Defendant submitted interrogatories asking plaintiff to name witnesses to the event and plaintiff answered that he thought
there were two or three witnesses but that he did not know their names.
Plaintiff subsequently learned the names of the witnesses and produced these
witnesses at the trial. Defendant protested that the testimony of these
12. 390 S.W.2d 553 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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witnesses should be excluded because their names were not mentioned in
the original interrogatory answers, nor were the answers ever amended to
include their names. The trial judge sustained the objection and refused,
to allow these witnesses to testify about the accident although the witnesses did testify (out of the jury's hearing) that they were first interviewed
by plaintiff's attorney long after the interrogatory answers were filed.18
Plaintiff put on his case without the excluded witnesses and a defendant's verdict resulted. Plaintiff then moved for a new trial on the sole
ground of error in excluding the testimony of these witnesses. Plaintiff
alleged that the interrogatories were truthful when answered and that no
subsequent interrogatories were ever filed, which called for the newly discovered information. The trial judge apparently had some misgivings about
his original ruling and he granted plaintiff a new trial. Defendant wanted
to save his verdict so he appealed claiming that the trial judge erred in
granting plaintiff a new trial.
Defendant conceded that the interrogatory answer was true when given
by plaintiff but claimed that plaintiff had an obligation to file amended
answers without additional prompting when he later discovered the witnesses' names.
The court of appeals chose to decide the case solely on the basis of
"whether tk/e trial court acted within the bounds of its authority" 14 in
granting the new trial. The court added that "it is not necessary for this
court to decide whether plaintiff was required by Missouri discovery rules
to amend his original answers and advise defendant of information learned
since filing them."' The court then concluded that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in granting the new trial.
The case is important for what is implied rather than the specific holding. The court implied, that the trial judge had discretion to deny the new
13. A related problem is whether a party may offer any evidence contrary
to the answers contained in interrogatories. Smith v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
358 S.W.2d 91 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962), "a case of first impression" in Missouri,
answered the qusetion saying, at page 94: "It has long been the rule in Missouri
that a party is not conclusively bound by his deposition answers, but on the
contrary may explain them away or contradict them at the trial (citing cases)
and by the very wording of the Missouri rules concerning interrogatories they are
co-extensive with and can be used the same extent as depositions."
The question is thoroughly explored in Joyner, Practice and Proced-ure-Discovery-Answers to Interrogatories as Limiting Proof at Trial, 27 Mo. L. REv.

242 (1962). The author discusses three Missouri cases which suggest that the trial
judge does have authority to keep out testimony inconsistent with the response
given in an interrogatory.
14. Auglur v. Zylich, supra note 12, at 555. (Emphasis in original.)
15. ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8

6

1966]

Divilbiss: Divilbiss: Current Problems in Pleading

PLEADING, DISCOVERY, SETTLEMENTS

trial as well as to grant it, and that a denial of plainiff's new trial motion
would also have been sustained on appeal. The court said:
It is well established that the trial court has a broad discretion
to chose a course of action during trial when evidence is challenged
on the ground it has not been disclosed by answers to interrogatories. In the sound exercise of that discretion, the trial court
may admit or reject such evidence, or otherwise determine and
impose appropriate sanctions for violations of rules governing interrogatories. 16
Undisclosed witnesses have been denied permission to testify in Missouri where the original interrogatory answer was not amended at the
17
proper time. In Central & So. Track Lines v. Westfall G.M.C. Truck, Inc.'
plaintiff suffered, damages to its trailer. Plaintiff charged that defendant
had negligently repaired a tractor by failing to connect a tie rod to the
steering apparatus. Plaintiff filed interrogatories asking defendant for names
of all employees who worked on the tractor or inspected it. Five names
were given and plaintiff took the depositions of all five. About twenty
months later the case came up for trial. Three days before trial defendant
allegedly learned of three additional employees who either worked on the
tractor or inspected it. This information was telephoned to plaintiff two
days before trial and on the morning of trial defendant asked leave to
amend his interrogatory answers to include the new names. The plaintiff
protested the late amendment and the trial judge denied defendant's request. The judge further refused to let the newly discovered witnesses testify
as defendant did not account for the long delay in getting these names.
A continuance was also denied because of plaintiff's special efforts to have
out-of-state witnesses present on that particular day.
In affirming the action of the trial judge, the Kansas City Court of
Appeals said:
To allow defendant, as here, to answer an inquiry concerning
the identity of key witnesses and then to allow a twenty month
period to lapse, with a request, not supported by a sound and compelling showing of just cause, to file amendments on the day of trial
disclosing new key witnesses would obviously prejudice plaintiff in
preparation for trial. Nor can we say as a matter of law that
under the circumstances shown a continuance would be fair to
16. Auglur v. Zylich, supra note 12, at 556.
17. 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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plaintiff and appear to offer a reasonable solution in view of plaintiff's problem and again securing the attendance of his out-ofstate and other witnesses. In any event, the trial judge is to be
accorded a broad and sound discretion when called upon to pass on
this type of problem, and we find no abuse of that discretion by his
refusal to permit the out-of-time filing of the amended answers to
the interrogatories and his refusal to permit a newly named person
therein to testify.'
The case differs from A'ugur v. Zylclk. in two important respects. First,
defendant's lawyer apparently notified plaintiff as soon as he got the new
information, even though it was only three .days before trial. Second, defendant was a corporation and thus charged with all the knowledge of its
employees. Defendant presumably had constructive knowledge of all the
facts when the original answer was filed. While the court did not proclaim
a continuing duty to amend on obtaining new evidence, the case is an important warning to lawyers as to how much discretion the trial judge has
in protecting litigants from misleading interrogatory answers. The cautious
lawyer will regard Aidgur v. Zylick as a red flag. When interrogatory
answers on file become misleading in the light of newly discovered evidence, good judgment would dictate filing amended answers. Failure to do
so may cause the trial judge to exercise his discretion in keeping out evidence which conflicts with the original answers. There is little reason to
believe that the appellate courts would interfere with such a ruling by
the trial judge.
B. Refisal to Answer Interrogatories
Litigants are occasionally reluctant to cooperate with the broad discovery procedures now permitted. When they refuse, severe sanctions are
generally imposed. Such was the case in State ex rel. Jones v. Reagan.'0
Plaintiff delivered her deceased mother to defendant's mortuary for
burying. Two weeks later the body turned up at St. Louis University Medical School as somebody's homework. The "remains were in such condition
that proper burial and proper funeral services were impossible." 20 Plaintiff
was upset. Replevin seemed inappropriate and trover likewise left something to be desired. Plaintiff settled on a suit for damages based on defendant's negligent failure to fulfill its contract of burial.
18. Id. at 847.
19. 382 S.W.2d 426 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
20. Id. at 427.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
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Plaintiff served interrogatories on defendant and when defendant
failed to answer, plaintiff filed a motion to compel answers. The motion
was sustained, defendant was ordered to answer, but again defendant failed.
The court then struck defendant's answer and pursuant to Civil Rule
61.0121 ordered a default. Answers to a few interrogatories followed and the
default was set aside, but when the remaining questions remained unanswered another default was entered. The court then heard, testimony on
damages and entered the judgment for $10,000.
On the appeal the defendant protested that a default judgment could
be
entered where defendant had an answer on file and that the judge
not
had improperly denied defendant a jury trial.
The court said:
If the trial court had no power to enter a default under these
circumstances, then the rule has no purpose, and the answers to
interrogatories could never be compelled. Whether or not defendant
had an answer on file is not in point. Under the aggravated circumstances showing defendant's utter disregard for various orders of
the court and notice of motions, the trial court exercised its discretionary power to enter judgment by default for defendant's
failure to answer interrogatories. 22
The power of courts to enter such orders has been recognized for at
least fifty-six years. The United States Supreme Court expressed the rule
in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas23 when defendant failed to produce
required witnesses and records for pre-trial discovery. The trial judge struck
his answer and entered a default judgment and the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the trial judge's action. The Court said:
As the power to strike an answer out and enter a default

. . .

is

clearly referable to the undoubted right of the law-making authority
to create a presumption in respect to the want of foundation of
an asserted defense against a defendant who surpresses or fails
to produce evidence when legally called upon to give or produce,
our opinion is that the contention that the section was repugnant
24
to the Constitution of the United States is without foundation.
21. Mo. R. Civ. P. 61.01(b) provides: "If any party ...refuses to obey any

order [to answer interrogations] ...the court may make such orders in regard
to the refusal as are just, and among others the following: . . .(3) An order strik-

ing out pleadings or parts thereof, or dismissing the action or proceedings or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party."
22. Supra note 20, at 430.
23. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
24. Id. at 353.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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The Missouri Supreme Court faced the issue in 191226 when a trial
judge struck the answer of a defendant who refused to give his deposition.
Defendant argued that the act violated the due process provision of both
the federal and Missouri constitutions, but the supreme court rejected the
argument and quoted from Hamnond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, saying:
[Tihe power exerted below was like the authority to default or
take a bill for confessed because of a failure to answer, based upon a
presumption that the material facts alleged or pleaded were admitted by not answering .... 26
III. SETTLEMENTS

Settlements in multi-claim law suits contain the hidden peril that the
release may have consequences far beyond those intended. Lawyers must
chart their courses with considerable care if they wish to avoid serious
problems. Portell v. Pevely Dairy Co. 27 illustrates one such hazardous area.
Plaintiff sued a master and servant for injuries sustained when he collided
with an automobile driven by servant within the scope of his employment.
Servant then counterclaimed for his own injuries. The jury denied plaintiff's
claims and awarded servant $1,500 on his counterclaim. Plaintiff appealed
and, while the appeal was pending, a settlement was paid to servant and
his counterclaim dismissed with prejudice. The master then moved to dismiss plaintiff's appeal contending that payment to servant in settlement
of his counterclaim worked an automatic release of master.
No such inadvertent release occurred because the money was paid by
plaintiff's liability insurer and plaintiff did nothing which could be regarded
as active participation in the settlement or ratification of the transaction.
Had pWlaintiff paid the money, the master would have been automatically
released although plaintiff gave no formal release to either master or
servant and intended no such consequences.
The rationale is this: When two parties are involved in a collision
and one party pays the other for a release, the party paying the money
is thereafter estopped from asserting a claim against the person paid. 28 Thus
25. Miles v. Armour, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S.W. 424 (1913).
26. Id. at 448, 144 S.W. at 426.
27. 388 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1965).
28. In Farmer v. Arnold, 371 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1963), Farmer and Arnold
collided and both sustained injuries. Farmer had no insurance and to avoid having
his license suspended he gave Arnold fifty dollars in return for a full release of
Arnold's claim against him. Thereafter Farmer brought suit against Arnold, and
Arnold moved for summary judgment on the basis of estoppel. The court said,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
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if plaintiff had paid servant, he would have been estopped from recovering
from servant. If he cannot recover from servant who was primarily liable,
he cannot recover from the master who is only secondarily liable.29
at page 268: "the crux of this controversy and of this appeal is whether nevertheless, in all the circumstances of this record, it was appropriate under summary
judgment procedure ... for the court to declare as a matter of law that the plaintiff Farmer was estopped from maintaining this action."
The court answers the question saying at page 269: "whatever the parties may
have thought or intended when the plaintiff Farmer paid Arnold $50 for a release
and regardless of whether the release constituted the entire contract, the release
was executed at the instigation of Farmer for his own immediate needs and benefit and he is now estopped after rendering Arnold all but defenseless from prosecuting one side of a tort action arising- out of a single transaction."
in England v. Yellow Transit Co., 225 S.W.2d 366 (Spr. Mo. App. 1949),
plaintiff brought suit against a master and servant for damages sustained in a
collision in which servant was driving master's car. The master and servant both
counterclaimed against plaintiff. After the counterclaims had been filed the master made a $500 settlement payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff and master entered into
a stipulation agreeing that plaintiff's petition against both defendants was dismissed but also stipulating that servant's counterclaim against plaintiff was in
no way affected by the settlement. Nothing was said about the status of master's
counterclaim against plaintiff.
Thereafter master indicated an intention to press its counterciaim and plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis of estoppel. The Springfield
Court of Appeals agreed, saying, at 369: "It seems to us that the offer to pay,
an actual payment of $500.00 to the plaintiff, an agreement to pay the expenses
of the litigation, the faliure to specifically except in the stipulation the counterclaim of [master] . . . , but specifically excepting the counterclaim of [servant]
... , the recital in the release that the purpose thereof was to avoid trouble and
expense of further investigation and litigation, and failure to specifically mention
the counterclaim in the negotiations leading to settlement and release, were all
calculated to and did lead the plaintiff to believe that the entire controversy
was being settled. She acted, in dismissing her case, receiving the payment and
signing the release, in reliance upon that belief, and reasonably so. Under these
circumstances [master] ... is now estopped to proceed further with their counterclaim."
Eberting v. Skinner, 364 S.W.2d 829 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963), raised a related
problem. In that case Eberting, an uninsured motorist, collided with a car driven
by Mrs. Skinner. In order to avoid loss of his driver's license he obtained from
Mrs. Skinner and her husband the necessary statutory release. He later brought
an action against Mrs. Skinner for personal injuries and the court sustained Mrs.
Skinner's summary judgment on the basis of some sort of estoppel. The court
said, at page 835: "In situations of this kind the courts have frequently applied
the principles of equitable estoppel . . . . In this instance the appellant, for his
own benefit, induced the respondent to change her position to her detriment . . .
[H]e cannot now take the shield which she has handed him and use it as a sword
against her." This case is strongly criticized in Caskey, Safety Responsibility Law
Release, 30 Mo. L. REv. 160 (1965).
29. In Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961), Max was injured when he
collided with an automobile driven by servant in the scope of his employment
for master. Servant filed the first suit against Max for his injuries. Max did not
file a counterclaim. Servants suit was dismissed before trial under a stipulation
providing: "All of the matters and things in controversy in the above entitled
cause having been adjusted, compromised and finally settled . . . [servant's suit
is dismissed with prejudice.]." 349 S.W.2d at 2.
Thereafter Max brought a suit against master. The supreme court said that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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The rule is different where an insurance company makes the payment
in an effort to protect itself from liability. In the instant case, the attorney
for plaintiff's insurance carrier filed an affidavit stating that he was not
representing the plaintiff individually and that he had paid the money
and obtained a release from servant without consulting with either plaintiff or her personal attorney. This was of critical importance for as the
court said:
[A] liability insurer's settlement of a claim against the insured,
made without the insured's consent or against his protest of nonliability, and not thereafter ratified by him, will not ordinarily bar
an action by the insured against the person receiving the settlement, on a claim arising out of the same set of facts. 0
The case serves as a timely reminder that obtaining a release may
work an estoppel not only as to future claims against the party from whom
the release was obtained but also from those secondarily liable.

the action of Max in compromising his case with servant effected an automatic
release of master. The court does not say whether Max paid the servant for the
dismissal, but there is no suggestion to the contrary.
The court said, at page 3: "when plaintiff settled [servant's]

...

suit against

her, agreeing without any qualifications that 'all matters and things in controversy'
had been 'adjusted, compromised and finally settled,' she gave up all rights she
might have had to sue him on any claim based on his negligence. This with the
agreement for dismissal 'with prejudice' amounted to a full release of [servant's]
...liability to her. A valid release of a servant from liability for tort operates to
release the master."
Continuing, the court said: "Our view is that because the basis of liability
on the theory of respondeat superior is that the master is liable only for the act
of his servant (and not for anything he himself did, as in the case of a joint tortfeasor), therefore, when the servant is not liable, the master for whom he was
acting at the time should not be liable. We hold that the settlement of [servant's]
* . .

suit released plaintiff's claim against him and therefore released plaintiff's

claim against his employer, the defendant herein."
Significantly the court distinguishes this case from Rudloff v. Johnson, 267
F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1959), on the basis that the attorneys who paid the settlement
money in that case were not the same attorneys who were representing the litigant's individual interest. The court implies that the attorneys who settled with
servant also represented Max in his individual action against the master.
30. Supra note 27, at 792. This is in accord with Kirtley v. Irey, 375 S.W.2d
129 (Mo. 1964), which also holds that "a liability insurer's settlement of a claim
against the insured, made without the insured's consent or against his protest
and non-liability and not thereafter ratified by him, will not ordinarily bar an
action by the insured against the person receiving the settlement, on a claim arising out of the same state of facts." 375 S.W.2d at 134.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/8
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